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EXTRATERRITORLAL ZONING:
REFLECTIONS ON ITS VALIDITY*

I.

FUNCTION AND NECESSITY

For many years the American law schools treated the

subject of municipal corporations as an unwanted and
unloved step-child.' It always struck me as being a bit
incongruous that of all the courses in the general area
of public law, the one that probably touched more lawyers
than any other was emphasized the least by the law
schools. During the past half decade, however, there
seems to have been a renaissance of interest in local gov* The author would like to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Mr.
Jack Hiller, Law Librarian and Instructor in Law at the School of Law,
Valparaiso University, in the preparation of this article.
1 A perusal of law school catalogues indicates that in a substantial
number of schools, a course in municipal corporations was not offered at
all, and in those in which it was dignified with a course number, it was
often taught only in alternate years. There was-and still is---only a small
handful of casebooks, and, until a year or so ago, the same was true of upto-date treatises, excepting, of course, Judge McQuillin's multi-volume
work. Cooley's hornbook was published in 1914, and the third edition of
Elliott's small text in 1925.
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ernment law.- It may be that this reawakening indicates a
growing awareness of the importance to the legal profession of the local community and it problems. For better
or for worse, this area of the law seems destined to
become highly specialized. The past few years have witnessed a tremendous emphasis on one aspect of local law
in particular - that of planning and zoning.' A substantial
portion of Dean Fordham's casebook 4 is given over to this
aspect of municipal law, and Professors Horack and Nolan
have produced an excellent casebook devoted exclusively
to land use control.* Planning commissions are burgeoning
throughout the country, the planning consultant is becoming fashionable, and people generally are becoming planning conscious. There is city planning and county planning, metropolitan planning and regional planning - interstate as well as intrastate. This rather unprecedented,
but perhaps long overdue, emphasis on planning may be
symptomatic of the postwar preoccupation with prosperity,
order, beauty and the good life. Whatever the reason,
planning is in vogue and is not likely to go out of fashion
in the foreseeable future.
The reference to planning is not quite so irrelevant to
the title of this paper as it may seem. Planning is at best
2

In the last two years, two relatively short treatises have been pub-

lished: AsNrIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW (1955) (two volumes);
YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1956) (three volumes). The subject is
also appearing with more frequency in law school catalogues.
3 Within the past three years there have been no less than five symposia
on the problems of local government. Symposium on Area Development,
28 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 453 (1956); Urban Housing and Planning, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 351 (1955); Land Planning in a Democracy, 20 LAw &
CoNrrfM. PROB. 197 (1955); Zoning in Illinois, U. ILL. L. FORUMI 167 (1954);
Florida Municipal Law, A Symposium, 6 U. FLA. L. REv. 275 (1953). The
reader will note that three of these are devoted to planning. Undoubtedly
there are others. Another sign of the times is the publication of new editions
of zoning treatises: METZENBAum, LAW OF ZONING (2d ed. 1955); RATHKOPI,
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING (3d ed. 1956); YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND
PRACTICE (2d ed. 1953).

-

FoRDHAm, LOCAL GOVERNmeNT LAW c.

5

HORACK AND NOLAN, LAND USE CONTROLS (1955).

8

(1949).
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a monumental waste of time and effort unless it is implemented so as to give reasonable assurance that the projected ends eventually will be realized. Zoning is one
of the chief tools of implementation. Before proceeding
further, each function should be put in its proper perspective. Planning ". . . connotes a systematic development contrived to promote the common interest ...."' It suggests

the most feasible approach to a proper relationship among
the various factors that together comprise community living, selected on the basis of that which will be most conducive to and commensurate with the common interest.7 On
the other hand, "Zoning is a separation of the municipality
into districts, and the regulation of buildings and structures
in the districts so created, in accordance with their construction and the nature and extent of their use ....It pertains not only to use but to the structural and architectural
design of buildings."' Briefly then, the planning function
primarily is that of outlining a course of action, and zoning
is designed to put that course of action into operation and
effect.
It is obvious that planning is entirely prospective. In
many communities there is not a great deal that can be
done with the status quo. Consequently, the planner must
exercise considerable foresight and devote his energies primarily to the part of the community that still possesses
enough elasticity to respond to his moulding influence.9
This means, of course, that his center of attention will be
drawn to land which is for the most part undeveloped, re6 Mills v. Baton Rouge, 210 La. 830, 28 So.2d 447, 451 (1946).

7 For further and more comprehensive definitions of planning, see
cit. supra note 5, c. 2; 1 RATHKOFF, op. cit. supra note
3, c. 1; 1 YOKLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2.
8 Mlills v. Baton Rouge, 210 La. 830, 28 So .2d 447, 451 (1946).
9 For a defense of long-range planning, see Weiner, Short-Time and

HoRAcK AND NoLA=, op.

Long-Time Planning, in PnAmNIG 1954: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL NATIONAL PLANNING CONFERNmCE 4 (1954). The author suggests that the
alleged future benefits of long-range planning must be accepted on faith.
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gardless of whether that land lies within or without
the corporate boundaries of a municipality."° The importance of planning for the future is recognized by most enabling legislation. These statutes ordinarily authorize planning commissions to plan the fringe area surrounding the
municipality." A planning commission, however, has only
advisory functions. Unless there is some power that can
compel adherence to its determinations, the planner's exquisitely drawn master plan is worth little more than
something that might have been. To make the master plan
a reality is the function of zoning. The restrictions suggested by the master plan become mandatory by virtue of the
zoning ordinance. ".... [A]ye, there's the rub • . .,12 So
long as planning remains advisory and there is freedom to
accept it or reject it, opposing forces lie dormant. But if
the power of the state is brought to bear and the element of
choice is removed, the docility of those affected suddenly
erupts in strenuous objection.
Thus far, the desirability of planning has only been
assumed. A word about that. Something less than astute
observation in almost any of the nation's cities should
convince even the most skeptical that planning is desirable.
A great many municipalities are conglomerates of
slums, crazy-quilt street systems, and multiple-deck sandwiches of apartment buildings, small houses, industries,
and businesses situated without rhyme or reason. The approaches to many cities, large and small, are nightmares of
irresponsibility. Drive-ins, small businesses, and industries
of all types line the highways: many of them are either
10 Of course, the planner also plays a significant part in planning for
the city's older environs. There is constant change in any community and

it is desirable to insure the proper direction of these changes, e.g., planning
to prevent an older residential area from deteriorating into a slum.
Urban renewal programs also fall within this class.
11 For complete citations to enabling legislation, see HOUSING AND
HomE FINANcE AGENCY, COmPARATIVE DIGEST OF MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY
ZONING ENABLING STATUTES

12

(1953).

Shakespeare, Hamlet Act I, se. i, 1.65.
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architectural monstrosities or one-story, paint-peeling
shacks. In any case, they not only detract immeasurably
from the attractiveness of the highway and retard future
development, but in many instances they also create serious health and safety hazards. These factors - and they
constitute only a few of the problems - can be prevented
by rational planning and zoning.' 3 They cannot be prevented without planning and zoning.
But why extraterritorial zoning? Why not plan the urban fringe, but postpone the imposition of use restrictions
until annexation? This may sound feasible (although I
doubt it), but there are compelling arguments that indicate its impracticability. It is a fact that the corporate
limits of some cities encompass a substantial amount
of undeveloped land. In the writer's opinion, however, this
is not ordinarily the case, particularly in the smaller cities
and towns. By annexing large areas of undeveloped land,
a city perhaps could obviate the necessity for the exercise
of extraterritorial powers and still accomplish its planning
objectives. This has a pleasing sound, but little else. In addition to the restrictions imposed by many of the annexation statutes, the courts have been reluctant to give their
approval to large-scale annexation of undeveloped lands.' 4
If foreseeable corporate use of the lands cannot be shown
which often is the case - annexation generally will be
denied. This limitation upon the city's power to annex
sets the stage for haphazard development 5 and the establishment of a myriad of nonconforming uses. The implica13 This is not meant to imply that there should be blind acceptance of
planning for planning's sake. "There is . .. no magic in 'planning.' There
is good and bad planning, insufficient and incompetent planning. The
process, good or bad, cannot be ignored for it has the capacity to
give value to property or to take it away." HoRACE: AND NOLAN, LAND USE
CoMmoLs 30 (1955).
I' See Annot, 64 A.L.R. 1335, 1346 (1929). Some of the cases collected
there will be discussed later.
15 "Unless this land can be planned and zoned before it becomes
developed, it will lose its agricultural characteristics without acquiring stable
urban qualities." HORACK AND NoLAw, op. cit. supra note 5, at 58.
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tions of this process obviously are seriously inimical to
the orderly development of the community.1 6 There can be
little planning when land use is a fait accompli. Where nonconforming uses have gained a foot hold, the traditional
approach of the courts has been frustrating to comprehensive zoning. With a few exceptions,' 7 it has been held that
a nonconforming user has acquired a vested interest that
cannot be divested summarily through the subsequent enactment of a zoning ordinance." If the city is precluded
from annexing sufficient undeveloped land, and if it is further denied the right to eliminate nonconforming uses after
annexation, there must be other alternatives if long-range
planning objectives are to be realized. One of these alternatives is extraterritorial zoning. By exerting this power
over undeveloped lands, the city can provide for its future
development in an orderly way and assure to subsequent
generations that municipalities will be relatively free of
the undesirable elements which today disfigure the faces
of so many of them. 9 Industry will not be permitted to
blight areas desirable for residential purposes, nor will
irrational development of land for residential purposes be
tolerated when it is ill-suited for that purpose and when
16 Note, Amortization and Performance Standardsin Zoning Regulations:
Study of Existing Non-Conforming Uses in an Indiana Community, 30 IND.
L. J. 521 (1955).
17 Perhaps the most notable of these are State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v.
McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v.
Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929), sustaining an ordinance which
required non-conforming users to cease operations within a year.
18 Higgins v. Baltimore, 206 Md. 89, 110 A.2d 503 (1954); Town of Somers
v. Camarco, 126 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio
St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953). But a nonconforming use must have come
into existence, Lutz v. City Plan Comm'n, 230 Ind. 74, 101 N.E.2d 187 (1951).
See also O'Reilly, The Non-conforming Use and Due Process of Law, 23
GEo. L. J. 218 (1935).
19 "Only as planning and zoning can create, without regard to territorial
boundary lines, an over-all community development which will provide
adequate industry, good business, desirable residential areas, and proper
community improvements and activities, will the area prosper and develop."
HoRAcK AND NOLAN, LAND USE CONRMOLS 58 (1955). ". . . [T]he power to
zone its suburbs, which, in actuality, are a part of the urban community, is
intimately related to the well-being of the city. That periphery is the city's
vital zoning problem." FORDHAm, LOCAL GOVFImuENT LAW 139 (1949).
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pre-emption by residential building will exclude desirable
industrial or commercial enterprises."
Extraterritorial zoning, this seemingly excellent product
of the planner's imagination, is not so easy to market. Planning zealots, of course, are extreme advocates of extraterritorial zoning, since they realize that effective planning is important without it. On the other hand, those
who at best are lukewarm about planning very likely will
resist any attempt to impose the restrictions that effective
planning necessitates, and those who are decidedly opposed
to planning in any form or manner will carry their opposition into vigorous operation.2 1 Land values, of course, are
affected by zoning. If a farmer could sell his land for industrial uses at five or ten times the price it could command
if sold for residential lots, one can understand his unhappiness when he is limited to the latter choice. 22 More20 "Industry may wish the land but it is already too far developed
with residences to make it profitable for industrial use. Or an inappropriate
industry develops its tract and blights an adjacent area suited and needed
for residential development. In either case the city suffers. It is understandable, then, that the city feels that it can fairly claim the right to control
and direct the development of the land adjacent to its boundaries." HoRAcK
Am NOLAN, op. cit. supra note 19.
21 During the last six months, several incidents have brought this
opposition into sharp focus. A circular published by the Farmers and Fringe
Area Citizens Committee, and widely distributed in Porter County, Indiana,
read, in part, as follows: "City Fringe & County Zoning Are Communistic!
We farmers and fringe area dwellers of Porter County, Indiana, humbly
petition you city dwellers and business men to refrain from using the
county and city zoning plans now proposed because they are so un-American
and will take from us our freeholds: 1st, the controlling members of the
commission are appointive and therefore if found corrupt or inept cannot
be removed by elections; 2nd, you city citizens are put to added expense to
support plan commissions, which in themselves can be unjust and full of
graft ... ; 5th, anything legal that we wish to do on the farm will cost us
many hundreds of dollars more . . . ; 8th, we can trade elsewhere, if you
insist on these zoning commissions." In Fowler, Indiana, approximately 150
farmers refused to leave a meeting of the city council until it agreed to
refrain from zoning the fringe. In north Porter County, farmers threatened
to and began withdrawing their accounts from local banks in protest over
proposed fringe zoning. This information was taken from a communication
to the author from Mr. Paul Miller, instructor in the Department of
Geography and Geology, Valparaiso University, and planning consultant.
22 "... [F]armers... generally resist all urban zoning and most rural
zoning as well." HoRAcK AND NOLAN, LAND USE CONTROLS 100 (1955). In a
Continued on page 374
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over, given a person who indulges in self-pity, or who is
completely in favor of restriction except when it affects
him, one can understand objection to limitations on freedom that are ostensibly for the good of the whole, especially when that good is to be found only in the nebulous future.
Before delving into the legal aspects of extraterritorial
zoning, one other factor should be mentioned, that is, the
effects of county or rural zoning. This type of zoning, properly understood and applied, has functions different from
those of typical urban zoning.2 3 Of course, it is not a perversion of its purpose if it is used in a manner complementary to urban zoning. Unless those charged with the responsibility of county zoning, however, are sympathetic
with the objectives of urban zoning (something not very
much in evidence at the moment), the likelihood of close
cooperation is somewhat remote. It is more likely that
county zoning will reflect the attitudes of rural residents
(as undoubtedly it should in a democracy); if that attitude
is one of hostility toward what they believe to be undue
restriction, county zoning will very probably be of little
aid to comprehensive planning and zoning.'
These arguments are designed to sustain the conclusion
that planning is desirable and that extraterritorial zoning is
an important, indeed an indispensable, element of planfootnote, the authors observe that, "It is a strange paradox, but true, that
farmers who depend so much upon cooperative action and the interchange
of services and machinery, are uniformly opposed to cooperative action or
public control when it relates to the land itself." Ibid.
23 "... [Al true rural zoning ordinance attempts to protect and develop
the proper uses of the soil. Rural zoning, of course, seeks to control non-agricultural uses as well. Thus, business and industry may be restricted to
particular zones. Irrigation, drainage, and water conservation districts may
be established independently of zoning. Soil conservation, erosion and flood
control, forestry, and other natural resources districts are commonly
established." HORACK AND NOLA-, op. cit. supra note 22. See also Warp,
Legal Status of Rural Zoning, 36 ILL. L. REv. 153 (1941), and Wertheimer,
Constitutionality of Rural Zoning, 26 CALIF. L. Rzv. 175 (1938).
24 See essays by Solberg and Stout, Planning and Zoning in Rural Areas,
in PILANNING 1953: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNuAL NATIONAL PLANNING CONFERENC- 163 (Solberg), 173 (Stout) (1953).
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ning. No pretense is made that the arguments are all inclusive of the question; it is certain that they are incomplete.
Since space does not'permit further elaboration of them,
and since they are, for the purposes of this paper, in the
domain of adiaphora, I have presumed to consider them
sufficient to sustain my basic assumption that extraterritorial zoning is good. On the basis on this assumption, I
shall proceed to the real problem at hand - is this type
of zoning consistent with the concepts of constitutional
government in a democratic society, or, to be more realistic, will the courts say it is or is not consistent therewith?

II.

ANTICIPATION OF JUDICIAL DECISION

There are no cases which have answered this question
directly.' As a consequence, I have chosen to consider
situations most nearly analogous, and, on the basis of the
extant case law, to attempt to find a pattern of judicial
thinking that might be invoked when questions of extraterritorial zoning are presented to the appellate tribunals.
Obviously, any conclusions necessarily must,be predictive,
at best.
A few brief generalizations should suffice to set out
the basic propositions relative to zoning extraterritorially.
Zoning qua zoning is of relatively recent origin. According
to one author, it had its beginnings in Germany less than
three-quarters of a century ago.2 6 As in other areas,27 the
United States was the rear guard of the European van. The
first comprehensive zoning law in this country was enacted
no earlier than 1916; its validity was sustained in 1 9 2 0.'
25 The writer believes that this situation will be short-lived. The
rumblings emanating from the hinterlands indicate the approach of an
irresistible force to an immovable object. The collision will soon echo in
appellate courts.
26 1 YOKILY, ZONING LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 2 (2d ed. 1953).
27 E.g., social security and workmen's compensation.
28 Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209

(1920).
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It was just a bit over thirty years ago that the issue was
presented to and decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States.29 Today a contention that the zoning power,
of itself, is in contravention of constitutional guaranties is
seldom made with any degree of seriousness. It is only
application of the zoning power to particular circumstances
that goads property owners into action, provides the courts
with opportunities to define its limits, and precipitates
refinements in the law." Every zoning restriction must
bear a relation to the proper objectives of the police
power,3 1 since zoning can be sustained only by subsuming
it under the police power. "The greatest good for the greatest number" is the clarion call, muted only by the rule of
reasonableness. 2 The second proposition is a double-barreled one: the police power is inherent in sovereignty, 33
and municipal corporations are not sovereign.3 This means
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
In the Euclid case, supra note 29, the Supreme Court gave notice that
there were limitations to the exercise of the power. In Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), it held that the line, difficult to determine
though it may be, had been overstepped.
31 Until a few years ago the majority of the cases limited the scope of
the police power by reference to health, safety, morals and welfare, the
traditional quartet of standards. Welfare, of course, can mean many things
to many people. However, it was given a relatively narrow construction.
Recent cases indicate a broadening concept of the police power, at least as it
is understood in the context of zoning. See Flora Realty and Investment Co.
v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771 (1951), appeal dismissed, 344
U.S. 802 (1952) (three acre lots); Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952) (minimum size house); State ex rel.
Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Weiland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955) (architectural conformity). See also Warp, Legal
Status of Rural Zoning, 36 ILL. L. REv. 153, 164 (1941): "The police power
extends beyond regulations designed to promote the public health, morals,
safety, and welfare to so dealing with existing conditions as to bring out
of them the greatest convenience or the greatest prosperity."
32 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2, 63 (2d ed. 1953). The word
"reasonable" or its antithesis can cover a multitude of sins, e.g., it is "unreasonable" and therefore deprives a person of his property without due
process of law; it is "unreasonable" and therefore denies a person equal
protection of the laws.
33 ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 233-34 (1939).
34 The municipal corporation is the "agent" of the state, empowered to
carry out the functions of the state in, over, and for the area over which it
has been given jurisdiction. This applies not only to the police power, but
also to all "governmental" (as opposed to "proprietary") functions.
29

30
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that local governments have no power to zone anything
unless they have been explicity authorized to do so by the
legislature. The final basic tenet is that municipal corporations usually have no extraterritorial powers."
A. Annexation Analogy
Brief reference was made above to the courts' attitudes
with respect to annexation of undeveloped lands. The
power of annexation and its counterparts, dissolution and
consolidation, it is true, are not lineal descendants of the
police power. They are merely methods by which the
sovereign determines to govern particular areas of its
domain. Therefore, although the relationship is somewhat
distant, there are several factors which could have an important bearing on the future of extraterritorial zoning. As
stated above,3 6 annexation statutes very often have a
negative influence on planning. The requirements of these
statutes very often preclude the primary city from annexing sufficient undeveloped lands to insure effective
planning. Among these statutory limitations are requirements for consent by a majority of those living in the area
to be annexed; a certain density of population; platted
lands; and prohibitions against the annexation of lands
used for agriculture or horticulture. 7 The courts, as a rule,
have been quite scrupulous in insisting upon strict compliance with these statutory requirements.3" The legislatures, of course, could ease these restrictions and thereby
remove at least one obstruction from the road to effective
35 City of Sedalia ex rel. Ferguson v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 81 F.2d 193
(8th Cir. 1936); Jones v. Hines, 157 Ala. 624, 47 So. 739 (1908); State v.
Eason, 114 N.C. 787, 19 S.E. 88 (1894); Light v. City of Danville, 168 Va.
181, 190 S.E. 276 (1937).
36 See pages 371-72.
37 For a discussion of this problem as it affects planning, see FORDHw,
A LAaER CONCEPT OF CoAiuNnTY 27-33 (1956).
38 People ex rel. Pletcher v.,City of Joliet, 328 Ill. 126, 159 N. E. 206 (1927);
Sharkey v. City of Butte, 52 Mont. 16, 155 Pac. 266 (1916); Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R. v. Nebraska City, 53 Neb. 453, 73 N.W. 952 (1898); Couch v. Marvin,
67 Ore. 341, 136 Pac. 6 (1913).
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planning.39 This, however, would be no panacea, for the
single word "reasonable" in the hands of the courts is still
a formidable weapon. The leading case involving the interpretation of this requirement is Vestal v. City of Little
Rock,4" the doctrine of which is considered basic in annexation situations where the question of reasonableness
is in issue. After announcing the guiding principles to be
used in determining the propriety of extending city limits, 1
the court said that city limits should not be extended to
take in lands when they are used only for purposes of
agriculture or horticulture, and are valuable on account
of such use, or when they are vacant and do not derive
special value from their adaptabilityfor city uses. Thus,
although the courts recognize the necessity for the annexation of a certain amount of undeveloped land,42 they often
scrutinize very carefully the amount of land annexed, the
possibility of benefit -

or lack of it -

to those residing in

the area to be annexed, and the municipality's apparent
land need and its motivation for annexing.43
39 The legislature is supreme in matters of local government, except as
it is restricted by federal or state constitutional provisions. Trenton v. New
Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N.H. 266 (1856). As to
supremacy in annexation matters, see Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161
(1907); State v. Cincinnati, 52 Ohio St. 419, 40 N.E. 508 (1895).
40 54 Ark. 321, 15 S.W. 891 (1891).
41 " . . . [C]ity limits may reasonably and properly be extended so as
to take in corntiguous lands (1) when they are platted and held for sale or
use as town lots; (2) whether platted or not, if they are held to be bought
on the market, and sold as town property, when they reach a value
corresponding with the views of the owner; (3) when they furnish the abode
for a densely settled community, or represent the actual growth of the
town beyond its legal boundary; (4) when they are needed for any proper
town purpose, as for the extension of its streets, or sewer, gas, or water
system, or to supply places for the abode or business of its residents, or for
the extension of the needed police regulation; and (5) when they are
valuable by reason of their adaptability for prospective town uses." Id. at 892.
42 "'A growing City . . . could hardly be expected to expand into
territoiy already covered by houses."' Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 214
Ark. 127, 214 S.W.2d 510, 512 (1948). See also A. M. Klemm & Son v. City
of Winter Haven, 141 Fla. 60, 192 So. 652 (1939), appeal dismissed, 309 U.S.
638 (1940) ; Tod v. Houston, 276 S.W. 419 (Tex. Com. App. 1925).
43 City of Sugar Creek v. Standard Oil of Indiana, 163 F.2d 320 (8th Cir.
1947) (attempt to annex land, including plot on which oil company planned
to build a multi-million dollar plant, although substantial amount of land
Continued on page 379
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In view of the courts' reluctance to recognize a municipality's power (aside from statutory compliance) of generous annexation, one may speculate that they will be no
more beneficent when faced with the issue of extraterritorial zoning. From a negative point of view, it may be
argued that zoning the fringe area is even more objectionable than annexing undeveloped land. In the case of the
former, there is restriction without any immediate and
tangible advantage, whereas in the case of the latter, those
people living in the annexed area will realize some immediate benefits, including police and fire protection and
other municipal services, and, of particular importance, a
voice in the government of the municipality.' It is also significant that in those cases in which the courts have balked
at the attempted annexation, the land area involved was
considerably less than that which could be encompassed by
an ordinance that would zone the fringe from the corporate
limits for two or three miles in all directions.4"
still available within city limits); Newport v. Owens, 213 Ark. 517, 211
S.W.2d 438 (1948) (denying city's petition to annex 960 acres, 90 acres of
which used for agriculture); Hustead v. Village of Phillips, 131 Neb. 303, 267
N.W. 919 (1936) (annexing farm land for revenue purposes); Couch v.
Martin, 67 Ore. 341, 136 Pac. 6 (1913) (meager electorate not contemplated
by statute); State ex rel. Taylor v. Edison, 76 Tex. 302, 13 S.W. 263 (1890)
(attempt to annex twenty-eight square miles for school purposes; unjust
to impose burdens of government without giving concomitant benefits). The
authority of this case, however, is dubious, since the fact situation was so
bizarre. In the twenty-five years from 1920 to 1945 the city had suffered a
net loss in population of one hundred. Of the 534 acres within the corporate
limits, 200 were occupied by Standard Oil, and of the remaining property
only 36% had ever been used for business or residential purposes. The
council met in secret session and read the ordinance three times in the one
evening. The land sought to be annexed took in the rights of way of two
railroads, a waterworks that did not service Sugar Creek, a suburban
development absorbing the overflow from Kansas City, and bottom lands
fit for nothing but grazing.
For a view considerably more liberal, see Norfolk County v. Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 45 S.E.2d 136 (1947), in which the court gave a verbal
spanking to suburbanites who take all of the advantages that the primary
city has to offer, including means of livelihood, but want none of the
responsibilities and burdens.
44 Representation in the local government and its relation to extraterritorial zoning will be discussed in greater detail below.
45 In Newport v. Owens, 213 Ark. 517, 211 S.W.2d 438 (1948), less than
10% of the area to be annexed was used for agricultural purposes, and the
Continued on page 380
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Although these arguments against extraterritorial zoning conceivably might be considered efficacious by some
courts, I would suggest that they are lacking in persuasiveness. In many of those cases in which the courts have found
the attempted annexation to be unreasonable, the emphasis, implicit and explicit, has been on the burden-benefit
factor. The courts have been chary about sanctioning the
balancing of an immediate burden of urban taxation with
only the future prospect of urban conveniences - streets,
sewers, water and gas facilities, and anything else that
requires considerable time and expense to extend to the
outer reaches of a municipality. Zoning, although restrictive, does not impose further burdens on those living in the
fringe in the same sense that increased taxation does. The
restrictions of fringe zoning, moreover, are considerably
less drastic than the typical urban zoning ordinance which
incidentally would become applicable to annexed lands.4 6
In addition, annexation is premised upon the idea of
present land need, while extraterritorial zoning is concerned with future need and development. There is, it
would seem, a decided difference between annexation and
all that it implies, when it it unnecessary for municipal
expansion, either present or within the foreseeable future,
and zoning, with its single restrictive - though perhaps
burdensome - element designed to protect the future
need of the municipality. Annexation is inescapably bound
to "today" and should be governed accordingly; zoning
should and must look ahead to "tomorrow," unfettered
by myopic thinking. Annexation and zoning are different
concepts, designed to accomplish different ends, and the
validity of one should not be made to depend upon
principles applicable to the other.
entire tract was roughly only one and one-half square miles. Under a
zoning ordinance, a city conceivably might control an area twenty times
its size, or even more.
46 Boise City v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 441, 243 P.2d 303 (1952);
City of Highland Park v. Calder, 269 Ill. App. 255 (1932).
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B. Taxation Analogy
In probing further for an answer, one may also analogize
extraterritorial zoning to the power of municipal taxation. The generally accepted proposition is that municipalities have no power to tax beyond their corporate limits.'
This usually is supported by some rather inarticulate contentions about denial of due process. The cases, however,
do not seem to justify such an unqualified conclusion.4"
Those cases cited in the previous footnote are significant
because all were decided solely on questions of existing
statutory authority or of statutory interpretation. Indeed,
there is respectable authority indicating the propriety of
such extraterritorial taxation if the municipality has been
given the necessary power. Of course, there are exceptions which will be referred to later.
4 9 it was held
In ConsolidatedFisheries Co. v. Marshall,
that a town had power to tax lessees of public lands over
which the town had been given control by the legislature.
The case turned on the interpretation of the statute. Since
the constitutional issue was not raised, however, nor mentioned by the court, one may speculate that there was
tacit recognition of the legislature's prerogative to grant
such power to the city. In Wible v. City of Bakersfield,"
a school district lay partly within and partly without the
corporate limits. The court reasoned that the entire
school district was within the corporate limits of the city
for school purposes and was, therefore, subject to taxation
47 This particular problem is governed in large measure by constitutional
provisions requiring uniformity of taxation upon the same class of subjects
within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing authority.
48 Smith v. Amidon, 102 Fla. 492, 136 So. 256 (1931) (statutory provision
making excluded lands non-assessable); Hardin v. Pavlat, 130 Neb. 829, 266
N.W. 637 (1936) (in absence of statute, no power to levy taxes on property
outside corporate limits); City Stores Co. v. Philadelphia, 376 Pa. 482, 103
A.2d 664 (1954) (denying power to tax on basis of statutory interpretation).
49 3 Terry 283 (Del. Super. Ct.), 32 A.2d 426 (1943), affd, 3 Terry (Del.)
532, 39 A.2d 413 (1944).
50 42 Cal. App. 77, 183 Pac. 291 (1919).
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by the city for school purposes. An extremely liberal point
of view emerged from an 1871 Virginia case.5 1 It involved
taxation of lands lying within a one-half mile area beyond
the corporate limits to assure the payment of interest to
citizens of Lynchburg and other stockholders of a railroad
servicing the vicinity. In answering the constitutionallybased challenge to extraterritorial taxation, the court said,
"The legislature in the exercise of its discretion, chose to
throw the town of Lynchburg, as it then stood, and the
adjacent territory for half a mile around, on every side, into
one district, for the purpose of this tax. It had a right to do
There is, however, another side to the coin. In Hughes
5 3 taxes had
v. Town of Davenport,
been levied on certain
annexed lands. This property was subsequently detached
because the annexation was found to be unreasonable. The
court held that to permit the city to collect taxes on the
excluded land would be to deny due process and equal protection of the law to the owners of the excluded land. Admittedly, this situation is somewhat different from the
normal extraterritorial imposition of taxes, but the court's
language was sufficiently broad to indicate a hostility toward this type of taxation.5" Of course, if the state constitution specifically provides that municipalities' powers of taxation are limited to their territorial boundaries, there
is little that the legislature can do, short of subterfuge.55
5i Langhorne v. Robinson, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) * 661 (1871).
52 Id. at* 669. The court added that the railroad was just as advantageous
to those living beyond the city limits as to those living within them. The
Langhorne case was cited with approval in Whiting v. Town of West Point,
88 Va. 905, 14 S.E. 698 (1892), and in Kaufle v. Delaney, 25 W. Va. 410 (1885).
See also Hardin v. Pavlat, 130 Neb. 829, 266 N.W. 637 (1936), in which the
court said that in the absence of a statute, cities have no authority to tax
lands beyond their boundaries.
53 141 Fla. 382, 193 So. 291 (1940).
54 To the same effect, see Klich v. Miami Land & Development Co., 139
Fla. 794, 191 So. 41 (1939) and Smith v. Amidon, 102 Fla. 492, 136 So. 256
(1931).
5Z In Pleasant Grove v. Holman, 59 Utah 242, 202 Pac. 1096 (1921), a
statute authorizing the city to "tax" users of water, whether within or
Continued on page 383
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Probably the clearest, and perhaps the oldest statement,
condemning extraterritorial taxation is found in a decision
of the Supreme Court of MVissouri. 6 In this case, the legislature had authorized the city to tax all real estate outside of and adjacent to the corporation for one-half mile.
The court held that this was a violation of basic constitutional rights. After admitting the legislature's "uncontrolled power of taxation," the court said:
.. [H]ere the attempt is to authorize a municipal corporation... arbitrarily, under the mask of a tax, to take
annually from those who are without its jurisdiction a
certain portion of their property lying within a halfmile of the corporate limits, which, we think, can not

be done .... But no instance, it is believed, can be found
where these corporations have been clothed with power
to tax others not within their local jurisdiction, for their

own local purposes; and if the legislature possess the
power now claimed over private property, they ought
to exercise it themselves, and57not delegate it to those
whose interest it is to abuse it.
It is significant that the court conceded the legislature's
power to tax the property in question in the same manner
as that attempted by the municipality, but denied its
right to delegate that power "to those whose interest it
is to abuse it."
What then does the analogy offer? There can be little argument against the proposition that a municipality has no
inherent power either to tax or to zone extraterritorially.
Assuming, however, that legislatures confer the power to
without the corporate limits, was found not to be in violation of such a
provision. The court said this was an "assessment" not a "tax," and since
it could be used only for water purposes, it did not come within the

constitutional inhibition. Quaere whether such a constitutional provision
could be rendered impotent by a grab-bag full of statutes authorizing

"assessments."

56 Wells v. City of Weston, 22 Mo. 384 (1856).
57
Id. at 389. In State ex rel. Hinson v. Nickerson, 99 Neb. 517, 156 N.W.
1039 (1916), the court said that property "within the city" could be taxed forcity purposes. By application of the maxim, inclusio unius, exclusio ahterius,
it might be concluded that there was an implied prohibition of extraterritorial taxation in the language of the court. Admittedly, this is somewhat speculative, inasmuch as this was another case of detached property.
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zone extraterritorially, will the courts or counsel rely on
extraterritorial taxing arguments? I have suggested that
they might. The more important consideration is whether
the courts will deem extraterritorial zoning sufficiently analogous to extraterritorial taxation to warrant the application of a single set of rules to both functions. In those
jurisdictions in which the courts have found no fundamental constitutional rights violated by extraterritorial
taxation, any opposition on the basis of this analogy will
lead only to a dead end. If the legislature can establish a
taxing district, including therein unincorporated lands,
and charge the municipal government with its administration - the approach used by the court in the Langhorne
case - then it would seem that it has equal power to
create a zoning district to be administered in the same manner. The difficult cases - when the taxation analogy is
used as the basis for the challenge to zoning - will be
in those jurisdictions in which there is no specific constitutional prohibition against extraterritorial taxation, but
where the courts either have found this to be a violation of
fundamental rights - as in the Wells case - or have demonstrated an affinity for "due process" or "equal protection" arguments. In these cases, the basic issue would be
the similarity or dissimilarity of the two functions, for the
less similar they are in theory, operation, and effect, the
less applicable the rules of one should be to the other."5
It would seem that the dissimiliarity is sufficient to permit those courts which condemn or would condemn extraterritorial taxation to sustain extraterritorial zoning and
still be consistent. In the first place, zoning is an exercise
of the police power, an inherent attribute of the sovereign,
and the least limitable of its powers when not exercised
58 In those states in which extraterritorial taxation is prohibited by
specific constitutional provision, the similarity argument should be without
merit, since the provision was intended to encompass one specific power, not
an undefined number of others.
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arbitrarily.5 9 The taxing power, however, is not so illimitable." The courts have been traditionally suspicious of the
taxing power;6" the same suspect nature does not attach to
the zoning power, as indicated by its immediate acceptance
by a conservative Supreme Court, 62 and by that Court's
more recent swing towards liberalism in zoning matters.6 3
When taxes are collected, there is a divestment of good,
hard money, while the effect of a zoning ordinance, restrictive though it may be, usually is not quite so tangible
nor obviously painful. Furthermore, as indicated in the discussion of annexation, the courts always are concerned, in
tax cases of this kind, with the proper balance of the burden-benefit formula. In zoning cases, this aspect ordinarily
does not - or at least should not - assume a position
of any great import. The exercise of the police power has
as its ultimate end the collective good and if, in the process
of attainment, hardships are created for individuals, this
is unfortunate, but necessary.64 It might be argued that
fringe zoning benefits no one since (1) the only effect it
has on fringe dwellers is one of restriction; and (2) residents of the municipality are too far removed to be effected.
But the idea that zoning must operate prospectively is too
well recognized for an argument of this kind to be
seriously considered.
If the above analysis is somewhat cursory, its super59 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
60 A constitutional amendment was required to legitimatize income
taxation and the rule of strict construction is still applied universally.
61 ".. . [T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy ...
." Chief
Jfistice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 210
(1819).
62 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
63 For a general discussion of the recent trend in the Supreme Court,
and its implications, see Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20
LAsw AND Colrmi. PROB. 317 (1955). For what is probably the most farreaching -opinion of the Supreme Court in this general area, see Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
64 Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916); Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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ficiality was deliberate. Although further reference will be
made to the tax analogy, I believe there is little possibility
that the conceptual raw material to be found in that area
can be refined into very much of real value. The real
pay dirt is in the police power stratum. After all, if zoning
is an exercise of the police power, police power concepts
more than likely will be the basis of all arguments concerning extraterritorial zoning. In this area there is considerably more of a concrete nature which can provide the
base for the formulation of tentative conclusions.
C. Stretching The Police Power
Cases involving questions of the municipalities' exercise
of the police power extraterritorially are many and varied.
Examination of a few of these might indicate the type
of reception the courts may be expected to give to extraterritorial zoning.
In State v. Rice,65 the challenged ordinance made it
unlawful to keep pigs vithin the city limits or for a quarter
mile beyond. The charter provided that all ordinances of
Greensboro enacted ".

.

. in the exercise of police powers

given to it for sanitary purposes or for the protection
of the property of the city, shall apply to the territory outside of said city limits within one mile of same in all directions."6 The court's only concern was with the presence
or absence of the necessary legislative authority giving
the city jurisdiction to exercise police power over adjacent
districts. 7 Cities frequently are given authority to enact
health ordinances having extraterritorial effect. Preventing
pollution of the city water supply is perhaps the most common example of this. In another North Carolina case,' an
158 N.C. 635, 74 S.E. 582 (1912).
Id. at 582.
67 For another case involving pigs, see Jones v. Hines, 157 Ala. 624, 47 So.
739 (1908).
68 State v. Eason, 114 N.C. 787, 19 S.E. 88 (1894).
65
66
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ordinance prohibited throwing dead fish into a river which
formed the corporate limits of the town. The court recognized the unquestionable power of the legislature to extend
the jurisdiction of the town for police purposes. In this
case, the extension was very limited, since the purpose of
the ordinance was satisfied by including no more than
the width of the stream. In a Utah case,69 however, an ordinance was sustained which prohibited the keeping of
horses, pigs, cattle, and other animals near a stream for
ten miles above the place where the water was taken for
municipal drinking purposes.7

It is not uncommon for municipalities to regulate businesses carried on within a certain distance beyond the
corporate boundaries. This usually is done through the
imposition of a license tax or through inspection measures.
As in many other areas, extraterritorial regulation of the
sale of alcoholic beverages rather generally has been upheld by the courts. In this latter type of case, the Indiana
Supreme Court has acknowledged the power of the legislature to designate the limits over which the jurisdiction
of municipal corporations shall extend, and conceded that
its judgment is conclusive on the courts.' Ordinances
requiring the inspection or licensing of dairies and
slaughterhouses located beyond the city limits, but
marketing their products within the city, have achieved a
like measure of success,' although the courts insist that
69

Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 145 Pac. 1047 (1915).

70 The question of extraterritorial power was not even discussed by
the court. The enabling act empowered the city to construct water works
and protect the supply from pollution. The court may have accepted the
legislature's power to confer such authority without question. See also
Holmes v. City of Fayetteville, 197 N.C. 740, 150 S.E. 624 (1929), and Light
v. City of Danville, 168 Va. 181, 190 S.E. 276 (1937).
71 Jourdan v. City of Evansville, 163 Ind. 512, 72 N.E. 544 (1904).
72 Chicago Packing and Provision Co. v. Chicago, 88 1. 221 (1878)
(slaughterhouse); Harrison v. Baltimore, 26 Md. (1 Gill) 264 (1843) (inspection and disinfection of ship); State v. Nelson, 66 Minn. 166, 68 N.W.
1066 (1896) (dairy); Korth v. City of Portland, 123 Ore. 180, 261 Pac. 895
(1927) (dairy).
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there be express statutory authority for such regulation
and control.7 3 Where the municipality regulates businesses located beyond the corporate limits by taxation,
the courts persist in their demand that these be police
measures; if they have a relation to the police power objectives and they are supported by statutory authority,
such ordinances usually are sustained.7
There are many ways in which a municipality may attempt to act extraterritorially, both withiin and without the
scope of the police power.' The perplexing problem is not
so much whether the legislatures can confer extraterritorial
powers on municipalities, but how much power may be
conferred. More specifically, may legislatures authorize
municipalities to exert broad extraterritorial zoning powers
over relatively large areas of unincorporated lands? The
cases indicate quite conclusively that there are no constitutional inhibitions precluding the legislatures from
giving municipalities authority to exercise the police
73 In the following cases, the attempt to exercise regulatory powers was
denied because of the lack of statutory authorization. Oakland v. Brock,
8 Cal. 2d. 639, 67 P.2d 344 (1937) (slaughterhouse); Dean Milk Co. v.
Aurora, 404 Ill. 331, 88 N.E.2d 827 (1949) (dairy); Dean Milk Co. v. Waukegan, 403 IIl. 597, 87 N.E.2d 751 (1949) (milk); Chicago v. Cuda, 403 Ill.
381, 86 N.E.2d 192 (1949) (requirement for weight certificate for solid fuel
delivered in city); City of Rockford v. Hey, 366 Ill. 526, 9 N.E.2d 317 (1937)
(ice cream).
74 White v. City of Decatur, 225 Ala. 646, 144 So. 873 (1932); Standard
Chemical & Oil Co. v. City of Troy, 201 Ala. 89, 77 So. 383 (1917). Contra,
City of Sedalia ex rel. Ferguson v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 81 F.2d 193 (8th
Cir. 1936) (absence of statutory authority).
75 City of Argenta v. Keath, 130 Ark. 334, 197 S.W. 686 (1917) (license fee
for cars for hire passing through city invalid in absence of statutory authorization); Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 630, 284 P.2d 9 (1944) (city
not allowed to take property outside its territorial limits under eminent
domain proceedings when the legislature had not granted such power);
City of Pueblo v. Flanders, 122 Colo. 571, 225 P.2d 832 (1950) (fire protection allowed;) Des Plaines v. Boeckenhauer, 383 IIl. 475, 50 N.E.2d 483
(1943) (sewer assessments disallowed); St. Louis v. Lee, 132 S.W.2d 1055
(Mo. App. 1939) (ordinance prescribing speed limit on interstate bridge
invalid in absence of statutory authorization); Central Lincoln Peoples'
Util. Dist. v. Smith, 170 Ore. 356, 133 P.2d 702 (1943) (distribution of
electricity allowed); Safe Way Motor Coach Co. v. City of Two Rivers,
256 Wis. 35, 39 N.W.2d 847 (1949) (ordinance prescribing city route of
busses invalid without statutory authorization).
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power extraterritorially in a limited way.7 6
One writer has taken the position that municipalities
may operate beyond their limits without restriction if the
legislatures grant such authority.' With all due respect,
I question whether the cases support so unqualified a conclusion. I concede that the courts' language in some of
the cases is sufficiently broad to suggest the absence, of
plethoric limitations on what the legislatures can do. For
example, in West Frankfort v. Fullop,75 the court said
without qualification that it was competent for the legislature to confer extraterritorial powers upon municipalities, and when granted, such powers have extraterritorial
effect. In a Nebraska case,7 it was held that the number,
nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon municipal corporations and the territory over which they should
be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state
legislature. The language of these cases - and there are
others in which equally broad statements are made standing alone, seems to point to tacit judicial acceptance
of general extraterritorial zoning powers. However, it is
vital to read these statements in the contexts in which
they were made, for it is no secret that courts have an
addiction for saying more in their opinions than is necessary to decide the case.
In addition, the more important fact to be remembered
76 Even in those cases in which the power is denied, there is a negative
acknowledgement that the legislatures can grant such power. "The authority
of municipal corporations to exercise powers beyond their territorial
limits must be derived from some statute .. . ." City of Argenta v. Keath,
130 Ark. 344, 197 S.W. 686, 688 (1917). In City of Sedalia ex rel. Ferguson
v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 81 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1936), the court said:
"[A] municipal corporation's power ceases at municipal boundaries and
cannot, without specific legislative authority, be exercised beyond its
geographical limits."
77 Bouwsma, The Validity of ExtraterritorialMunicipal Zoning, 8 VAND.
L. Rsv. 806, 811 (1955). The author cites as his authority, Central Lincoln
Peoples' Util. Dist. v. Smith, 170 Ore. 356, 133 P.2d 702 (1943). It should
be noted that this case dealt with a public utility.
78 6 I11.2d 609, 129 N.E.2d 682, 685 (1955).
79

Lang v. Sanitary Dist. of Norfolk, 160 Neb. 754, 71 N.W.2d 608 (1955).
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is that in none of the above cases was the scope of extraterritorial power

-

general or zoning -

in issue. In fact,

the powers the municipalities were attempting to exercise,
with or without legislative authority, were quite limited in
effect as compared to sweeping zoning powers, and usually
were directed toward a specific thing, i.e., liquor traffic, pig
sties, pollution of the city's water supply, slaughterhouses,
and dairies, etc. All of these, of course, are related to police
power objectives; and if they have been sustained, so then
perhaps should zoning. There is, however, the possibility
that the courts might consider a comprehensive zoning
ordinance that imposes general restrictions over land use
in a wide area in anticipationof possible future problems
quite differently from ordinances that are relatively narrow in scope and directed toward an existent and immediate problem. Police power restrictions antedated zoning by a considerable length of time, and the courts may
not be entirely receptive to the contention that since
specific extraterritorial restrictions have been sustained,
extraterritorial zoning ordinances should be accorded the
same respect and treatment.
There is some authority indicating that the courts may
not be eager to approve extraterritorial zoning powers
that are exercised on an extensive scale. Fifty years ago,
the Supreme Court of Tennessee wrestled with the problem of extraterritoriality 0 The enabling act covered considerably more than zoning. It authorized the city of Memphis to exercise all governmental and police powers for
two miles beyond the corporate limits. Unfortunately, because of the extent of the powers involved, this decision is
not as authoritative for zoning purposes as it might appear.
Before beginning the demolition process, the court conceded it to be within the power of the legislature to authorize
subordinate corporations to pass ordinances or laws hay90

Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798 (1907).
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ing restricted effect beyond their limits. Note the word
"restricted" - an omen. After this pacifying prologue, the
court proceeded to destroy the legislation*in language that
bears repetition:
. . . [Eix necessitate a limited police power may be
granted to municipalities over a small section of country
surrounding their boundaries for their protection against
nuisances, and to safeguard the health of the people residing in them; but even this is hard to justify on
any principle other than that the municipality is in such
matters the agent of the state itself for the protection of
the people of the state. But that agency cannot be
used as a basis for conferring power upon municipalities
over territory outside of them any further than bare
necessity requires. Certain it is that there can be no
justification for extending over an outside strip of country, two miles in width, or of any less width, all the governmental powers of the city, or even all the police
powers of the city.

...

The exercise of governmental

powers over the people embraced within any area or
territory, necessarily involves control to a very material
degree over their person and property.8 ' (Emphasis
added.)

Of course, it is readily admitted that in addition to the
almost limitless powers conferred by the enabling act, the
vintage of the Malone case saps it of a great deal of its virility. 2 Zoning's nativity in the United States was yet a
decade away, and it was two decades away from coming
of age. But there are hints of the same attitude in more
recent opinions. Gust v. Township of Canton involved a
township ordinance which prohibited the establishment
of trailer parks anywhere in the township. The township,
located in the Detroit metropolitan area, was bisected by
Id. at 806.
See also Jones v. Hines, 157 Ala. 624. 47 So. 739, 740 (1908), in which.
the court said, "While it is true that police powers may sometimes be given
81

82

for a limited space around the city limits for special purposes, yet they
must be specially given . . . '
83 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955).
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two railroads along which industries were being developed.
The planners wanted to keep the area zoned for residential
purposes in order to accommodate those who would be attracted by the industries. It was admitted by the planners
that concentration of population in the vicinity was twenty
to twenty-five years in the future (although there was
some speculation that it might be sooner), but they were
eager for the development to proceed in an orderly way.
In invalidating the ordinance, the court said:
If the action of a township board in zoning property
in a manner which would otherwise be arbitrary and
unreasonable under present conditions is rendered valid
by the fact that the board anticipates that in the future
conditions will develop under which such zoning would
not be arbitrary or unreasonable and believes that it will
be conducive thereto, then the only limit on the
board's powers in that regard would seem to be the
measure of its expectations and beliefs. The extent of
the owner's right to the free use of his property in
the manner deemed best by him is not to be determined
by such speculative standards. The test of validity is
not whether the prohibition may at some time in the
future bear a real and substantial relationship to the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare, but
whether it does so now. 84

This case is not entirely satisfactory for several reasons.
First, the Supreme Court of Michigan has evinced a
decided conservatism in zoning matters."5 Secondly, the
prohibition in the ordinance may have been somewhat

more stringent than is typical of most fringe area ordinances. Finally, the "twenty to twenty-five year" factor
seems to have been more than the court could swallow.
Moreover, this is not an extraterritorial case at all; it is a
simple case involving the question of reasonableness. Recognizing these shortcomings, and at the risk of doing ex81

Id. at 774.

85 See Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W.2d 387 (1943), and
Frischkorn Constr. Co. v. Lambert, 315 Mich. 556, 24 N.W.2d 209 (1946).
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actly that which I criticized previously, it is suggested that
some of the language of the court is pertinent to the
problem of extraterritorial zoning. The court viewed with
ill-concealed distaste the "speculative standards" of "expectations and beliefs" as the only limitations on the ex•ercise of the zoning power. Fringe zoning is cut from the
same sheet, although the piece is perhaps smaller. Of equal
significance is the statement that the prohibition to be
valid must bear a substantial relationship to present police power objectives. Possible future relationship was
considered insufficient. The weasel words are "substantial
relationship ... now." Does a municipal zoning ordinance
restricting an area two or three miles away from the city
limits bear a "substantial relationship now"? One might
very well find that it does not!
The rather adverse picture toward extraterritorial
zoning described thus far is not without its antithesis.
There is evidence tending to support fringe zoning which
is equal to or more formidable than that condemning it.
In StandardChemical & Oil Co. v. City of Troy, 6 the court
said, in language broad enough to include zoning, that it
may be necessary for a city to exert its police powers beyond the city limits in order to insure the health, safety,
morals and general welfare of the municipality. A recent
North Carolina case"7 may contain a further hint as to the
ultimate fate of extraterritorial zoning. Here the defendant was charged with violating an ordinance of the city of
Winston-Salem that had zoned residential an area lying
beyond the city limits. When the ordinance was adopted
there was no statutory authority for extraterritorial zoning.
The legislature subsequently amended the statute extending municipalities' jurisdiction for zoning purposes, but the
city did not re-enact its ordinance. It was held that the ordi86

201 Ala. 89, 77 So. 383 (1917).

87

State v. Owen, 242 N.C. 525, 88 S.E.2d 832 (1955).
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nance, originally invalid because enacted without statutory
authority, was not activated automatically by the amendment. Nothing was said regarding the validity of an extraterritorial zoning ordinance enacted pursuant to statutory
authority, but the court's language and its apparent unconcern with that issue might be taken as an implicit.
recognition of its validity. The court's emphasis was on the
subsequent inert character of the ordinance, but there was
an indirect invitation to enact a valid ordinance on the
basis of the amended statute. In confining itself to the
statement that a municipal ordinance invalid under an
enabling act existing at the time of its enactment is not
validated by mere amendment of the statute, so that an
ordinance might be validly enacted, the court may have
been implying that it would deal charitably with authorized extraterritorial zoning ordinances.
D. ExtraterritorialSubdivision Control
Another avenue of approach to a determination of the
validity of extraterritorial zoning is to examine the treatment accorded its companion, extraterritorial subdivision
control."8 Space does not permit a detailed discussion of
subdivision control and its relation to zoning," but the
language of some of the cases may be helpful in detecting
an attitude that might bear on the outcome of extraterri88 For an excellent discussion on subdivision control, see Melli, Subdivision Control in Wisconsin, Wis. L. Rxv. 389 (1953), and Note, An Analysis
of Subdivision Control Legislation, 28 IND. L. J. 544 (1952-53). Both articles
contain complete citations to subdivision control legislation.
89 Superficially, subdivision controls are designed to prevent fraud
(reasonable assurance to the purchaser that he is getting the amount of
land he bargained for), and to insure the existence of an adequate street
system, parks, sewers, etc. It has little to do with land use. Under many
of the statutes, the controls apply only when the land is platted. In other
words, they are conditions precedent to the recording of the plat, but there
are few restrictions against selling parcels by metes and bounds. And, of
course, without zoning restrictions, the purchaser can put the land to
whatever use he chooses. For a more refined distinction, see Note, Land
Subdivision Control, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1226 (1952).
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torial zoning issues. In a 1920 case,9" the Connecticut
Supreme Court took a far-sighted view of subdivision
control. It called attention to existing eyesores, narrow streets and other characteristics of urban communities, and attributed all of them to a lack of planning.
It recognized the inimical effect of these factors on the
public health, safety, morals and welfare, and concluded
that without planning controls, unscrupulous promoters
would profit at the expense of the community's welfare.
In Prudential Co-Op. Realty Co. v. Youngstown..1 in
which subdivision' control with the additive of extraterritoriality was involved, the court was even more blunt in
saying: "... [T]he statement that narrow streets and other
obstructions without limit may be established by suburban owners, and that the Legislature is powerless to intervene, is a travesty on justice and government."9 2 The
court added that a city has a vital interest in the area immediately surrounding it, since it will grow outward. This
type of control faced its most recent test in the Illinois
Supreme Court. 3 After paying proper homage to the timehonored doctrine that municipalities enjoy no extraterritorial powers, the court blandly stated that if the legislature sees fit to confer special extraterritorial powers on
municipalities, the courts will recognize and give effect to
those powers.9 "
Since there is some kinship, at least on the extraterritorial level, between subdivision controls (which appear
to have weathered the storm)," and zoning (which still is
90 Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 111 Ati. 354 (1920). However, this case did not involve extraterritorial control.
91 118 Ohio St. 204, 160 N.E. 695 (1928).
92

Id. at 698.

Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill.2d 233, 137 NE. 2d 371 (1956).
94 A similar case in which the court refused to discuss the constitutional
issue is Peterson v. Vasak, 162 Neb. 498, 76 N.W.2d 420 (1956).
93

95 For a collection of cases touching all phases of subdivision control,
see Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 524 (1950).
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dragging anchor), one may speculate that the courts are
in the process of becoming more liberal in their approach
to the concepts of planning, an attitude which forecasts
calm seas for zoning cases of the future. 6 There is some
evidence, however, of the courts' reluctance to face these
problems on a realistic basis, which can do little else than
envelop them in a cloud of uncertainty. For example, in
Ridgefield Land Co. v. Detroit,9" the court sustained a subdivision control ordinance by predicating it upon the idea
that plat recording is a privilege to be enjoyed by the subdivider only upon compliance with reasonable conditions.
It is quite evident that this type of approach will be of
little value to the resolution of extraterritorial zoning issues.
III.

LACK OF REPRESENTATION OBJECTION

Thus far the discussion has centered on what the courts'
reaction to the general idea of extraterritorial zoning might
be, while only limited reference has been made to the
reasons underlying this anticipated reaction. The pattern
would be incomplete without developing more fully the
legal bases for objections to fringe zoning and indicating
how receptive the courts may be expected to be to arguments based on these objections. Although many of the
pertinent cases abound in meaningless generalities, there
are others in which the courts expressed, with a relatively
high degree of clarity, the reasons for their decisions.
Aside from the practical obstructions in the path to successful fringe zoning,9" one of the serious legal impediments probably will be the lack of representation argu96

See, however, HORACK AND NOLAN,

L.U=

USE CONTROLS 203 (1955):

"As statutes extended authority to local legislative bodies to determine
the quality and intensity of land use, the standards imposed by judicial
review became more exact."
97 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
98 See note 21 supra.
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ment that appears in both extraterritorial tax and police
regulation cases.9 9 Since the courts seem to consider this
argument synonymous with the constitutional objections
of lack of due process and lack of consent by the governed,
no effort has been made to treat them differently.
In an Alabama case'0 0 - to invoke the tax analogy again
- the court, although sustaining an extraterritorial licensing ordinance, took precautions to add a caveat. The legislature, it said, is without power to authorize the levy of a
tax for revenue on businesses or occupations not carried on
within the corporate limits, since this would amount to taxation without representation and the taking of private
property without due process. Conceding that an ordinary
intramural zoning restriction is tantamount to "taking"
only when it is unreasonable, the argument of non-representation might seem to apply with equal force and merit
to any exercise of extraterritorial zoning powers. The Florida Supreme Court used language essentially the same, although in the more general phraseology of "due process"
and "equal protection."'' Further, the strong statement of
the Wells case ' 2 quoted earlier, 0 3 reflects a decided antipathy towards permitting municipal control unless there
is commensurate municipal benefit.
Leaving the extraterritorial taxing problem for the moment, the same unfavorable attitude can be discovered in
cases involving extraterritorial police regulations. In
Smeltzer v. Messer,' the issue of fringe zoning was
squarely before the Kentucky appellate court. Through
99 Robinson v. Norfolk, 108 Va. 14, 60 S.E. 762 (1908); Brown v. City
of Cle Elum, 145 Wash. 588, 261 Pac. 112 (1927). In the latter case, a
constitutional provision was interpreted as a prohibition against the exercise of the police power extraterritorially. There was a dissenting opinion.
100 White v. City of Decatur, 225 Ala. 646, 144 So. 873 (1932).
31 Hughes v. Town of Davenport, 141 Fla. 382, 193 So. 291 (1940). However, this was a case of detached land.
102 Wells v. City of Weston, 22 Mo. 384 (1856).
103

See page 383.

101

311 Ky. 692, 225 S.W.2d 96 (1949).
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strategic maneuvers, the court managed a successful outflanking operation, emerged unscathed, and decided almost
nothing. The fringe, over which the city attempted to exert
its zoning powers (with statutory authorization), included
lands situated in two adjoining counties. Inasmuch as it
had been decided in an earlier case °5 that cities could
not annex lands in other counties, the court felt
that its use was not so reasonably related to the city's
development as to fall within the purview of the statutes 06
In the general confusion, extraterritorial zoning may have
gained or lost a little ground - I am not sure which.
On the loss side, the court said:
The above principles (doctrine of intraterritoriality
and strict construction of the police power) are significant
in this case because the city's action, if sustained,
seriously impairs the rights of a person owning property
beyond its limits who has no voice in its legislative policies, and who receives no legally recognizable benefit
07
to such property from the city government.'

I realize that instead of being inimical to extraterritorial zoning, this statement, because it was made in the
county-line-barrier context, might turn out to be the contrary. The use of the present tense, however, confuses and
concerns me. Had the court said "who never will have,
or never can have" instead of "who has," and had it said
"who never will receive, or who never can receive" instead
Town of Elsmere v. Tanner, 245 Ky. 376, 53 S.W.2d 522 (1932).
Consider the implications of the combined effect of these two cases.
Artificial boundaries are barriers to effective planning. In the absence of
research, the writer can only guess that a substantial number of cities
are situated on or near county lines. In any jurisdiction following the rule
of the Tanner case, this would mean that cities so situated could be developed in an orderly and rational way up to a point, and then- chaos!
Certainly, a line existing only in the imagination is not going to inhibit the
citizenry from occupying the land on either side. Indeed, freedom from
the threat of annexation and other controls would act as a catalyst for just
such a movement. This is another illustration of the depressing effect of
some of our annexation laws and the interpretation given to them by the
courts. See also FoPDHAm, A LARGa CONCEPT or Commutmrry 27 (1956).
107 225 S.W.2d at 97-98.
105
106
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of "who receives," it would have been consistent with its
county-line position. But as it is written, it could be
considered sweeping enough to include all extraterritorial
zoning. Perhaps I am grasping at straws. It may have been
nothing more than a slip of the pen.
The strongest language that forebodes ill for extraterritorial zoning is found in the inconoclastic Malone case."'
The court said:
The control in the present instance is given, not to
any one chosen or elected by the people over whom
they are to exercise dominion, but to the officers of a
foreign body, chosen for the service of that body,
and not for the people to be affected by the powers
given.
This is the representation argument in its most precipitate form. After speaking about the special legislation
aspect of the case (the power had been given to Memphis
only), the court went on:
But upon the general question we do not hesitate to say
that the Legislature has no more power to take the property of one man and give it to a coporation, municipal or
otherwise, than it has to give his property to another
citizen; and no more has it power to impose burdens
upon the citizen in favor of a municipal corporation of
which he is not a member than it has to impose burdens
upon him in behalf of another man who has rendered
to him no equivalent.

109

But immediately preceding the last quoted sentence,
the court said:
We need not consider whether the Legislature would
have the power to impose such burdens upon the
people living near to all of the other cities and towns
of the state, since such general legislation would immediately produce an uprising which would insure its
0
repeal.
108 Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798, 806 (1907).
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
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This latter statement, it is suggested, effectively emasculated the lack-of-representation argument.
If there is any great merit to the representation argument, I fail to appreciate it. Granted that there shall be
no government without the consent of the governed, the
argument is enhanced but little, since the governed have
given their consent through their representation in the
legislature.' The difference between legislative authorization for a particular purpose, such as regulating liquor
sales beyond the corporate boundaries, on the one hand,
and authority to exert a more general power, such as zoning, on the other, is one of degree only, at least so far as
the representation question is concerned. If the former
is not in violation of fundamental rights, the latter should
be considered of equal compatibility. There is some judicial
support for this position. In a Connecticut case, 11 2 the cost
of maintaining a bridge built by virtue of a legislative
enactment was placed upon the towns benefited thereby.
In answer to the contention that this was taxation without
representation, the court said that all those affected were
sufficiently represented in the legislature." 3
A side door approach to this problem of representation
is premised on the axiom that the legislature is supreme in
matters of local government, a doctrine qualified only by
constitutional limitations. This flanking operation is best
illustrated by the Langhorne case."' In answer to the representation argument, the court said:
:11 The claimed "right" to local self-government has been successfully
relegated to a mythological status. See McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent
Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 190, 299 (1916). This
claimed "right" is so closely allied to the representation argument that
one might consider the rejection of one as tantamount to a rejection of
the other.
112 State ex. rel. Bulkeley v. Williams, 68 Conn. 131, 35 Ati. 24 (1896).
1-3 Id. at 29. It added that this action was not prohibited by anything
in the doctrine of the right of local self-government.
11
Langhorne v. Robinson, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 661 (1871).
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The whole power of taxation belonged . . . to the Legislature; a city or county had none, except such as the
Legislature might choose to give it. ... [T]he power of
local taxation has usually been conferred upon those municipal bodies or their officers. Where the power.., has
been delegated to such local authorities, they may,
in strictness of language, be said to be the 'representatives' of the people, by whom the tax is imposed, within
the language of the Bill of Rights .... And yet, in a legal
sense, the tax in any such case is imposed by the representatives of the people in the Legislature; the power
...
being exercised .. . by those to whom they have
seen fit to delegate it.
When the power to impose a tax is thus delegated to
local authorities, they do not exercise their power under
the authority which belongs to them as local officers.
They exercise only the special authority delegated to
them by the Legislature, in the particular case, and for
the particular purpose. On principle, I can imagine no
reason why the power might not as well be delegated to
any other persons, in the discretion of the Legislature.
The members of'the Legislature are the representatives
of the people .... 115

Addressing itself more directly to the extraterritorial
feature of the act, the court continued:
This superadded authority is distinct from, and independent of, their general authority as municipal officers of
the city; as much so as if they had not been the same
persons. When they exercise this special and superadded
authority, they do not do so . . . as the common council
of Lynchburg, but as a body of men to whom a special
authority has been delegated by the Legislature. 11 6

This approach is admirably suited to the zoning problem.
The city councils could be considered as the delegates
of the legislature for the purpose of zoning a district to include the particular municipality and as much of the
fringe area as the legislature deems proper and necessary.
This would logically stop any argument based on lack of
315 Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 669.

116
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representation,"' for it is extremely doubtful that the legislature's right to exercise the police power for zoning
purposes, and the further right (given proper standards)
to delegate it would be questioned.
Another approach, closely akin to that just discussed,
has been suggested."' It is predicated upon the accepted
notion that the situs and extent of a municipality's boundaries are within the absolute discretion of the legislature.
Exercising this discretion, the legislature can - and does
- establish multiple limits within which the city may
operate for particular purposes. For example, there can
be one boundary for political purposes, another for schools,
and still another for streets and sewers. Using this approach, it can be argued that the legislature can establish
the municipality's corporate limits for zoning purposes at a
117 This suggested approach as applied to the zoning problem is not
original.
"If the extraterritorial police authority conferred upon a local unit goes
beyond the achievement of the objectives of that unit can it be sustained
on the theory that the state has simply seen fit to employ it in the discharge
of that part of the state's total governmental responsibility?" FORDHA31,
LocAL GovEsN=NT LAw 140

(1949). The Langhorne case was severely

limited, if not overruled, by Robinson v. Norfolk, 108 Va. 14, 60 S.E. 762
(1908). It was held that the Langhorne case was decided on the basis of the
Constitution of 1830 which did not include the provision that "all taxes shall
be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits
of the authority levying the tax." Id. at 763. This provision, contained in
the Constitution of 1851, was interpreted as precluding the type of taxation
that was sustained in the Langhorne case. In the writer's opinion, however,
this is not necessarily an abrogation of the Langhorne approach to the
representation argument. There are meritorious arguments in opposition
to the view of the Robinson case. Does such a constitutional limitation
imply that the boundaries of a taxing district be coincidental with those
of a political district? Is it not possible that people living within and without the corporate boundaries might be of the same class, at least for some
purposes? See also the dissent in Brown v. City of Cle Elum, 145 Wash.
588, 261 Pac. 112 (1927).
138 See Anderson, The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities, 10 MINM. L. REV.
475 (1926). The author suggests that a municipality has multiple boundaries.
It is a "bundle of jurisdictions." Id. at 479. He says of extraterritorial
powers, ". . . [W]e may look upon the extension of power as either an
extension of the municipal boundaries for one or more purposes, or as a
legislative act giving a limited extraterritorial effect to municipal regulation, or as a direct conferment of extraterritorial power upon a city." Id.
at 577.
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point different from its limits for political purposes.
All things considered, it is quite unlikely that the courts
will give much credence to arguments based on lack of
representation or due process.' 1 9 The amount of water
that has passed under the bridge since the Malone" '° and
Wells 1 cases has washed away much of whatever starch
they may have had originally. As has been indicated,
the courts in recent years have shown a marked liberality
when considering questions of zoning. There is no good
reason why this trend should stop suddenly at the corporate boundaries. In the Smeltzer case, " the court observed cautiously "that any municipality has an interest
in its approaches ... [when] it may reasonably be contemplated that such territory will eventually become a
part of the city."'
It added that future expansion of a
city's territorial limits is a basic consideration in the intentiorr of the legislature when enacting planning and zoning statutes." Practical considerations aside,' the concept of extraterritorial zoning, as such, should not find the
courts hostile. This obviously does not imply, however, that
119 It is possible that not everyone shares the writer's optimism. Some
of the planning and zoning acts provide for fringe representation. For
example, the Indiana Planning Act was amended in 1953 to provide for
the appointment to the city planning commission of two residents of the
extraterritorial fringe. IND. ANN. STAT. §53-734a (Burns 1951). Several
considerations may have motivated the amendment, viz., the desire to
enable cities to acquire first-hand information from fringe dwellers; the
feeling that representation on the planning commission might make fringe
zoning more palatable; and anticipation of the statute being challenged
on due process grounds. If it was the last of these, I suggest that the
amendment is next to worthless. Although the fringe representatives have
voting power as members of the commission, there is still no representation
at all in the final zoning authority, the city council.
320 Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798 (1907).
321 Wells v. City of Weston, 22 Mo. 384 (1856).
122 Smeltzer v. Messer, 311 Ky. 692, 225 S.W.2d 96 (1949).
123 Id. at 97.
124
Ibid.
3
25 I.e., the active opposition of fringe dwellers, which could be intensive
enough and sufficiently sustained to preclude effective fringe zoning.
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the power of either the legislature or the municipality will
be unlimited. It does mean that the law relative to what is
and what is not permissible will be developed by a case
to case process through the media of variances, exceptions
and amendments, all of which are encompassed by the
word "reasonable."
IV.

MODIFICATION OF "REASONABLE

AND

SUBSTANTIAL RELATION" STANDARD

Two questions very probably will occupy the center of
the court's attention in extraterritorial zoning cases of the
future: how much restriction may the city impose, and
how far may it extend its influence and still meet the test
of reasonableness? In the absence of any cases directly in
point, I shall again resort to analogies.
The phrase found in nearly every case in which the
zoning ordinance is called into question is that it must bear
a reasonable and substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare." 6 The type of case
which is most nearly similar to extraterritorial zoning involves zoning of undeveloped land. As a general proposition, the courts have been relatively charitable toward
attempts to zone undeveloped lands. There are some exceptions, but these appear in cases in which there was
no showing that the area was in the process of development or that there would be any development in the
foreseeable future. "2 The Supreme Court of Mississippi
established three criteria for determing the validity of
zoning ordinances restricting rural lands to residential
purposes. 2 8 It said that the area, to be so restricted, must
be a residential section manifested by the actual presence
1 YOKI Y, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 32 (2d ed. 1953).
27 Arverne Bay Const. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
128 Frederic v. Board of Supervisors, 197 Miss. 561, 20 So. 2d 92, sugg. of
error overruled, 20 So. 2d 671 (1945).
126
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of enough inhabited residences to show a fair demand that
it continue to be restricted to residential uses, or it must
have been supplied with sufficient improved roads, water
supply and lighting connections so that the lots will sell for
residential purposes at reasonable prices. If neither of these
are present, the ordinance will be valid if public authorities
have adopted a comprehensive plan to furnish such conveniences within a reasonably short time. 9 In direct contrast is an Iowa case,' 30 in which it was held that a district may be zoned for residential purposes to the exclusion
of industry, although it is only sparsely settled and adapted
for industrial uses. A similarly liberal point of view was
taken by the Supreme Court of California, holding that
slow development of a district in the use for which it has
been zoned is not determinative of the reasonableness of
of the zoning restrictions.3 The court stated that one of
the objectives of zoning regulations is to guide the future
development of residential areas; therefore, to be effective,
these "regulations must necessarily look to the future
... The same sentiment was expressed in a federal

decision eighteen years earlier, 3 ' in which land - approximately 400 acres - located seven miles from the heart of
Los Angeles had been restricted to residential uses. Although the property was used primarily for agricultural
purposes, a few expensive residences had been built, and
adjacent land had been equipped with streets and sewers.
Evidence strongly indicated the presence of oil on the property. The land was worth about $10,000 an acre for residential purposes, as compared to millions if it proved to be
oil-producing. The court, in sustaining the ordinance, said
that zoning ordinances look to future development of the
329
:30
'3'

Id. at 94.
Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354 (1928).
Lockard v. Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38, 45-46 (1949).

132

Id. at 46.

L33 Marblehead Land Co. v. Los Angeles, 47 F2d 528 (9th Cir. 1931).
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city, rather than to a protection of a pre-existing status. 3 4
Thus the ordinance was upheld in the face of three seemingly compelling arguments opposed to it - distance, the
rural nature of the district, and the tremendous differential

in land value.

131

The optimism that might be generated by the seeming
liberality of the courts in sustaining zoning of undeveloped
lands should be tempered with caution. There are, I believe, some pertinent factors that cannot be overlooked. In
the first place, the test of "reasonableness" is only one of
the elements of extraterritorial zoning. The courts could
very well consider zoning of unincorporated areas as
being quite different from zoning annexed lands, although
they both may be rural in character. Annexation assumes
necessity, and necessity presupposes development within
the reasonably foreseeable future. The courts always have
been decidedly antipathetic toward speculation. 36 Secondly, but directly related, the amount of land encompassed
by an extraterritorial zoning ordinance can be infinitely
greater than that involved in most cases in which ordinances zoning undeveloped lands were challenged. Development of land situated on the three-mile periphery of the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of a municipality is in the
rather remote future. This would be especially true of a
small or medium-sized city, unless there was an indication of a coming boom in oil, steel or uranium. There is
a striking example of this in northwestern Indiana. For
about a year, at least one of the nation's steel companies
has been buying up land at the southern tip of Lake
Id. at 531.
135 For similar holdings on the eastern seaboard, see Ellicott v. Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23 A.2d 649 (1942); Wilbur v. City of Newton, 302 Mass.
38, 18 N.E.2d 365 (1938); West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169
Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 658 (1937); and from the
Supreme Court of the United States, Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274
U.S. 325 (1927).
136 A precise application of this is found in Gust v. Township of Canton,
342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955).
'34
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Michigan (rumor has it that others are similarly occupied).
Ogden Dunes, one of several small, residential communities situated on the lake shore, has a municipal area of
about 500 acres and a population of approximately 700. If
it exerts its extraterritorial zoning power - something
it is threatening to do -it
will control 8000 acres, and
effectively eliminate the "threat" of having a steel mill
in its back yard. Whether it is reasonable for a small
town to control an area sixteen times its size is the
type of question with which the courts will be faced. They
apparently have not considered it unreasonable for a
city to restrict itself almost entirely to residential uses. 37
It might be argued that it is necessary for a town to
keep a large steel mill at a substantial distance from
its corporate boundaries in order to preserve the residential character of the community. Moreover, since industrial development will attract large numbers of people to
the area, it is probable that the city will enjoy a rapid
growth. Viewing the problem from this point of view, the
restriction of so much territory may seem reasonable. But
if other nearby towns, similarly situated and of the same
character and attitude, exert like controls over their
fringe areas, literally all of the land will be pre-empted
to the total exclusion of industry.'3 8 In such case, the likelihood of substantial development, let alone rapid development, becomes remote indeed, and the controls take on
the aura of unreasonableness. The situation is dilemmatic,
for I believe that the courts would be guilty of parochialism
if they were to view the problems in total isolation from
one another.
In order to legitimatize the concept of extraterritorial
137 Cf. The Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Piedmont, 278 P.2d
943 (Cal. App. 2d), aff' 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d 438 (1955); Borough of
Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182 (L. 1953).
138 This particular area is ideally suited for industrial uses in view of its
proximity to rail transportation and the Great Lakes, the latter being of
particular importance with the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway.
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zoning, the courts very probably will have to formulate new
criteria of reasonableness. These will require a greater
emphasis on foresight and development in futuro, with the
concomitant acceptance of opinions and advice of experts,
speculative though they may be.' 3 9 It is conceivable that
the courts might look askance at a statute which gives
two or three mile extraterritorial jurisdiction to all cities"
regardless of their size or classification. The relationship
between present size and future growth of a large city
may be quite different from that of a small town. Predicting
future development of an area circumscribed by a line
three miles beyond the corporate limits may be entirely
reasonable when a large city is the generating center of the
expansion, but it may be altogether unreasonable when
a hamlet is the nucleus.
It is not so much the type of control that is important
in establishing the line of demarcation. A pig sty, a
slaughterhouse, or a tavern, all located just beyond the corporate limits, may be just as deleterious to the public
health, morals, safety and welfare of a small town as to
a large city. It is rather the permissible extent of the
territory over which control is exercised that will require
further clarification. It is important to remember that
in most of the cases in which extraterritorial police regulations were sustained, the uses regulated or prohibited
had, or would have had, a present inimical effect, whereas
extraterritorial zoning purposes to control something
which might in the future have such an effect if the
municipality grows to the projected size. The courts
may insist that the statutes reflect some relationship
between the size of the municipality and its extraterritorial zoning jurisdiction. 4 ° Even though the old idea that
Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955).
Of course, the city is not compelled to zone to the full extent of its
extraterritorial jurisdiction. For example, the enabling act in Indiana provides "for the development of the city and such contiguous unincorporated
area outside the city as, in the judgment of the commission, bears reasonable
Continued on page 409
139

14o
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zoning must bear a real and substantial relation to police
power objectives "now" is being discarded in favor of the
newer theory that, to be effective, zoning must look to
the future, it is relatively certain that the courts are not
going to sanction extraterritorial restriction on the basis
of a prophecy that a village will be a thriving metropolis
a century hence. Their decisions may very well. be
determined by the answers to the questions - how far
and how fast? This may necessitate scaling the extraterritorial jurisdiction to the class or population of municipalities - two miles for cities of the first class, a quarter
mile for towns of less than 3000 population, for example.
Whether or not this can be worked out practically can
be left to the planners.
It is true, of course, that the regulations of land use
in the urban fringe very often are considerably less restrictive than they are in the municipality itself. It is common to preserve the status quo, which usually means agricultural and residential uses. 4 ' The courts may be more
inclined to sustain an ordinance which permits rather
liberal land use than they would be if the ordinance
were comparable to those in effect within the municipality.
The disappointed farmer, however, who is precluded from
selling his land at a high price, will take little comfort
from the fact that he can either continue farming or
sell his land for house lots. How much restriction is reasonable restriction within the ambit of the police power,
very probably will be determined by application of the
accepted standards, qualified negatively by the element of
extraterritoriality and its various facets, and positively
by the coming of age of foresightedness.
relation to the development of the city." IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-734 (Burns
1951).
14-' "In a city ordinance it usually means a district from which industrial
or business uses are excluded, where any type of residential structure may
be erected, and where any agricultural or horticultural activity . . . may

be pursued. In general, it is a district of few restrictions." HoRAcK AND
NoLAN, LAmD USE CoNTRoLs 99 (1955).
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CONCLUSION

The legality of extraterritorial zoning, generally and
specifically, is only a single part in the vast machine of
planning and, at the moment, appears to be a most vital
part. Although there are probably other devices for
accomplishing the same ends,' the planners seem to be
particularly attracted to extraterritorial zoning. I suggest
that they have a good case for establishing its legality as
a general proposition. Nevertheless courts may be expected
to find specific ordinances invalid on the grounds of unreasonableness, just as they have in the past found all
other types of zoning ordinances invalid for the same
reasons.
No attempt has been made to build a case for or
against the need for, or the desirability of, extraterritorial
zoning. This is primarily the job of the planner. Nor has the
discussion so much as touched on the seemingly infinite
number of problems that the whole planning process can
spawn - jurisdiction; 4 3 the interrelation of city, township,
county, metropolitan and regional planning;' the effect
of natural and artificial boundaries, to name only a few.
Each of these, in turn, will add its own progeny to the
family tree- No one pretends that these problems will
142 Dean Fordham is not overly-impressed with the idea of extraterritorial zoning. No doubt his excellent ideas for achieving the ultimate in
planning will be considered by some as being quite iconoclastic. See FoRDHAM, A LARGER CONCEPT OF Comuxmr
21-33 (1956). See also Anderson,
The ExtraterritorialPowers of Cities, 10 MiNw. L. REv. 475 (1926).
143 In addition to the urban-rural conflict, Professors Horack and Nolan
suggest two others- that arising when two or more cities expand their

jurisdictional controls so that each seeks to exercise control over the same
land, and that arising when two cities have a common boundry, but each
has a different policy as to the development of the land situated on its
side of the land. HORACK AND NOLAN, LAND USE CONTROLS, c.2 at 58.
'14- A bill introduced into the last session of the Indiana Legislature provides for area planfning. It permits joinder of townships with adjacent cities
or counties and seems aimed primarily at counties that are unwilling or
unable to provide county-wide planning organizations. At this writing, the
bill's future was still in doubt.
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solve themselves. Consequently, a few well-chosen test
cases would do much to clear the air of some of the
grosser forms of uncertainty. Perhaps the dearth of
cases reflects a universal assumption of the validity of
extraterritorial zoning. If this is so, I may have been unduly cautious in some of my conclusions as to what the
courts might be expected to do. I have no quarrel with
the proposition that fringe zoning, as such, is legal. Indeed,
I believe it almost a certainty that only a very few conservative courts, if any, will find the idea repugnant to
their conceptions of constitutional guaranties. But even in
the face of this conclusion, I believe that planners and local governmental bodies would feel considerably more
secure if they could proceed with the confidence that their
basic ideas, at least, had been judicially sanctioned.
Far more important and far more uncertain is the
question of reasonable fringe zoning. As stated above,
the present tests and standards will require some remodeling to bring them into contemporary design. The concept
of extraterritorial zoning is, for all practical purposes, a
new and, in a sense, a drastic innovation. Assuming
that it is desirable, its acceptance in principle alone will
be insufficient. To make it work properly and efficiently
will require new guideposts, adapted to serve the ends of
extraterritorial zoning within the framework of democratic
living. The best quality guideposts are those fashioned
by the courts from the raw materials of actual cases. Permitting - or should it be said, compelling - the zoning
authorities to drift about unguided may invite adverse
consequences, both practical and legal. Fringe residents
may be driven to chronic antagonism by the extreme or
irrational zoning of overly enthusiastic planners. They
could, by striking whenever and wherever a vulnerable
spot appeared, disrupt the whole process. A set of principles may not entirely calm the troubled water, but it
-45 See pages 407-09.
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will at least provide a rudder for the ship.
When these cases reach the appellate level, the courts
will have to shift gears if salutary accomplishments are to
be made. Their legal thinking must mesh with that of
the community in general and of the planners in particular.
Ideas shrouded in parochialism will have nothing other
than a stifling effect. Also to be abandoned is the notion
that because something is old it is therefore good. The
courts would do well to remember in this area that their
primary concern, and that of the planners, is not the
solution of today's problems but the prevention of tomorrow's. The new concepts of the community, including
extraterritorial zoning, have far outdistanced stare decisis."4 During the past decade in particular, they have
made, and in the future will continue to make, great
demands on the creativity and ingenuity of the appellate
court judges.14 On the whole, the courts have responded
well to the challenge;1 4 in some instances, perhaps too
well. 4 9 The progress and the good of the community are
important, but so also are the rights of the individual. No
one with any objectivity wants the state to crash ahead
oblivious of where or upon whom it steps. Nor does anyone
have license to hinder, needlessly and unreasonably, the
progress of the community. The courts would be guilty
146 See essays by Babcock, Haar and Horack, Emerging Legal Issues in
Zoning, in PLANNING 1954: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL PLANNING CONFERENCE,
147

133 (Babcock), 138 (Haar), 146 (Horack) (1954).
".. . [W]e can exercise a quality of foresight which deserves a better

characterization than 'expediency.' Each generation must meet its own
problems. What it owes to the next is to act with all the foresight and
imagination it can muster." FORDHAm, A LARGER CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY 7
(1956).
148 See Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROs. 199 (1955).
149 Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CoNTm'.
PRoB. 317 (1955). The author is disturbed by the trend. He feels that in our
eagerness to achieve democratic living through planning, we may be
battling toward a Pyrrhic victory.
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of disservice if they were to unduly favor, advertently or
inadvertently, clumsily or blindly, the one over the other.
Striking a delicate balance between these two conflicting
interests is an intricate maneuver, and it is this that will
tax the energies and mental acumen of the judges. The
most that can be expected of them is that they will succeed;
the least is that they will try.
Louis F. Bartelt, Jr.*
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